NYLS Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 4 Faculty Presentation Day

Article 2

January 2008

Constitutional Law and Values—Version ’08 (Not Necessarily an
Upgrade)
Nadine Strossen
New York Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law
and Society Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the Litigation
Commons

Recommended Citation
Nadine Strossen, Constitutional Law and Values—Version ’08 (Not Necessarily an Upgrade), 53 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 735 (2008-2009).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
NADINE STROSSEN

Constitutional Law and Values—Version
’08 (Not Necessarily an Upgrade)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Nadine Strossen is a professor of law at New York Law School and former
president of the American Civil Liberties Union. This is an edited version of the oral presentation that
Professor Strossen made on April 2, 2008, at the New York Law School Faculty Presentation Day, Dinner
Session, “Constitutional Law and Values.” Most of the footnotes were prepared by Professor Strossen’s Chief
Aide, Steven Cunningham (NYLS ’99), based on her guidance and with the assistance of her Research
Assistant Joshua Shoenfeld (NYLS ’10). Accordingly, Steven Cunningham bears both the credit and the
responsibility for the footnotes.

735

This essay concerns a very current and unanticipated constitutional development
from March 17, 2008. On that date, the Supreme Court surprised constitutional law
experts when it decided to review the government’s power to ban so-called “indecent”
expression in the broadcast media1 for the first time since the Court’s only prior
ruling on point: its 1978 decision in the case of Federal Communications Commission
v. Pacifica.2
It was surprising that the Court granted the certiorari petition in this case, which
is called Fox Television Stations v. Federal Communications Commission, since the
ruling at issue, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, was based on a
narrow issue of administrative law.3 Specifically, the Second Circuit held that the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) had not provided a sufficient
explanation for its dramatic new crackdown on broadcast “indecency”4 in the wake of
the infamous “wardrobe malfunction” at the televised 2004 Super Bowl game, which
one commentator called “a tempest in a C-cup!”5
If you have not been following these new broadcast censorship measures closely,
I do not think you could imagine how extreme they are. The FCC has been imposing
record-breaking fines on broadcasters even for the fleeting, spontaneous use of a
single four-letter word in a clearly non-sexual context.6 For example, the FCC
condemned a documentary film about blues musicians, which was made by Martin
Scorsese and broadcasted by an educational television station, because some of the
artists being interviewed uttered what the FCC discreetly calls the “f-word” or the
“s-word.”7 The FCC even ruled that the news program, The Early Show, had
committed “indecency” because during a live interview, a guest used the word
“bullshitter”; the FCC stressed that its censorship rules contain “no exemption [for
news].”8
The FCC’s new zero tolerance approach is so extreme that it even has been
condemned by some former officials of the FCC itself; officials who had supported
1.

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008);
see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take Up On-Air Vulgarity Again, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2008, at A16.

2.

438 U.S. 726 (1978).

3.

See 489 F.3d 444.

4.

Id. at 462.

5.

Liz Langley, Consider Context: Out-of-Place and You’re Out of Line, Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 27, 2007,
at 6. See generally CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008) (vacating the FCC’s orders imposing
a monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) for the broadcast of “indecent” material in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999, and remanding for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion). Although the CBS decision involved other aspects of the FCC’s regime governing broadcast
“indecency” than those at issue in the Fox case, and although both circuit court rulings were based on
non-constitutional grounds, ultimately both cases involve the same fundamental First Amendment
principles, which this essay addresses.

6.

See In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe
Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order).

7.

John Eggerton, FCC ‘Whitewashing’ Blues, Says Scorsese, Broadcasting & Cable, May 8, 2006, http://
www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6332444.html?display=Breaking+News.

8.

Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 454, 458, 463 (2d Cir. 2007), cert granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3496 (Mar.
17, 2008) (No. 07-582).
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prior FCC limits on broadcast indecency. Yet, even they felt impelled to denounce
the recent repression as “a radical . . . censorship crusade that will . . . chill . . . all but
the blandest . . . program fare.”9
In the Fox case that the Supreme Court just agreed to review, Fox and the other
broadcast networks had also challenged the FCC’s sweeping new restrictions on
statutory and First Amendment grounds, but the Second Circuit did not need to
resolve those issues because it struck down the new rules on narrower administrative
law grounds. That said, the Second Circuit’s opinion did include a section, explicitly
labeled “dicta,” that noted the substantial First Amendment problems with the FCC’s
ramped-up restrictions.10 But the Supreme Court rarely reaches issues that the lower
courts have not addressed fully on the merits.11
Nonetheless, the U.S. Solicitor General, on behalf of the FCC, strongly urged
the High Court to hear the Fox case, stressing its extremely important constitutional
implications.12 The Solicitor General argued to the Supreme Court that the Second
Circuit’s ruling “strikes at the heart of ” the entire “broadcast indecency regulatory
framework.”13 He argued that the Second Circuit’s decision “effectively nullifies”
the federal statute that bars “indecent” expression over the airwaves and that it defies
the Supreme Court’s 1978 Pacifica ruling, which had upheld that statute.14
In short, the U.S. government invited the Supreme Court to re-examine not only
the specific FCC rules at issue in the Fox case itself, but also the broad fundamental
underlying First Amendment questions about whether the broadcast media should
continue to be relegated to second-class status under the First Amendment. The
Court could thus use this case for a long overdue re-examination of whether it should
continue to enforce Pacifica’s ban on “indecent” expression from broadcasting, even
though, post-Pacifica, the Court has held that such expression is constitutionally
protected in every other medium.15
I will briefly outline the core First Amendment problems that mar not only the
FCC’s new crackdown on broadcast “indecency,” but also any restriction on any
sexually-oriented expression in any medium. I want to stress the insoluble First
Amendment problems with any censorial regime in this area, no matter what adjective
is used for the targeted expression—for example, “indecent,” “offensive,” “obscene,”
or “pornographic.”
9.

Brief of Former FCC Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and in Support of a Declaration
That Indecency Enforcement Violates the First Amendment at 1, Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d 444
(No. 06-5358).

10. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 462 n.12.
11.

See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1308 (1973).

12. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fox Television Stations, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (No. 07-582).
13. Id. at 28.
14.

Id. at 29.

15.

See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (cable television); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Internet); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996) (cable television); Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (dial-a-porn).
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These First Amendment problems arise no matter how the stigmatizing term is
defined and no matter what the government’s goal is—for example, protecting
children or women or so-called “traditional family values.” The inevitable First
Amendment flaw with any such regulatory regime flows from the fact that, in our
wonderfully diverse society, we all have widely divergent ideas, values, and tastes,
especially about what sexual expression we find positive or negative for ourselves and
our own children. Therefore, we cannot responsibly delegate these inherently
personal choices to anyone else, including government officials or our fellow
citizens.
Let me describe a cartoon that well captures this reality: it shows three people in
an art museum looking at a classic nude female torso, a fragment of an ancient
sculpture minus limbs. Each viewer’s reaction is shown in an air bubble. The first
one thinks, “Art!”; the second thinks, “Smut!”; and the third thinks, “An insult to
amputees!”
In such an inescapably subjective, value-laden area, it is inherently impossible to
come up with clear guidelines. For example, for the past half-century, the Supreme
Court has tried but failed to come up with objective standards for defining
constitutionally unprotected obscenity.16 The most famous line in the Court’s many
unsuccessful efforts came from former Justice Potter Stewart, when he candidly
admitted: I cannot define it, “[b]ut I know it when I see it.”17 The problem, though,
is that every judge, along with everyone else, sees a different “it”!
That fact was well-stated by another highly respected former Justice, John
Marshall Harlan, a distinguished graduate of our own law school (class of 1924).18
As Justice Harlan put it, “One [person’s] vulgarity is another’s lyric.”19 We individuals
even have different perspectives about whether any given expression has any sexual
content at all. This is captured by the old joke about the man who sees every inkblot
his psychiatrist shows him as wildly erotic. When his psychiatrist says to him,
“You’re obsessed with sex,” the man answers: “What do you mean I’m obsessed?
You’re the one who keeps showing me all these dirty pictures.”!!!
The problem with such irreducibly vague concepts is that enforcing officials will
necessarily exercise their unfettered discretion according to their own subjective
tastes, or those of politically powerful community members. In consequence, the
enforcement patterns will be arbitrary at best, discriminatory at worst. At best,
which particular expression will be deemed off limits will be completely unpredictable.
This causes what courts call a “chilling effect” because when no one wants to run the
risk of criminal prosecution, people may well self-censor, not engaging in expression

16. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies

§

11.3.4.2 (3d ed.

2006).
17.

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).

18. James F. Simon, Foreword: The New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice John

Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
19.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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that might be deemed unacceptable by the powers that be.20 That self-censorship
not only violates the free speech rights of all those who were deterred from speaking;
it also deprives all the rest of us of the chance to hear valued expression, including
constitutionally protected speech.21
To illustrate this inherent problem, I would like to cite some of the FCC’s recent
rulings enforcing its new zero-tolerance policy, which is the direct focus of the Fox
case.
Again, the FCC maintains that it may punish even a single, spontaneous use of a
four-letter word, even when it has no sexual connotation, and even if it is part of a
program with serious value.22 However, the FCC has stressed that it will not always
punish such a word, since it has to exercise its discretion to take into account the
entire context in which the suspect word was uttered.23
This compounds the First Amendment problems, by leading to arbitrary,
unpredictable results. Let me cite some examples of recent FCC rulings enforcing
these new policies, which were all included in a single recent order.24 The FCC held
that “bullshit” was indecent, but that “dick” and “dickhead” were not indecent. It
held that “fuck ’em” was indecent, but that “up yours” and “kiss my ass” were not
indecent. It held that non-explicit suggestions of teenagers’ sexual activity in general
were indecent, but that explicit discussions of specific teen sexual practices were not
indecent.25 As I noted earlier, the FCC held that blues musicians’ uses of “fuck” and
“shit” in Martin Scorsese’s documentary film were indecent, but it held that actors’
uses of the very same words in the fictional film Saving Private Ryan were not.26
In response to these inevitably erratic rulings, no wonder we have seen so much
self-censorship in broadcasting lately. For example, before the FCC issued the order
that decreed Saving Private Ryan was not subject to its “fleeting expletive” ban, many
television stations had cancelled their planned airing of Saving Private Ryan on

20. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S.,

419 U.S. 1314, 1318 (1974).
21.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656; Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Playboy Entm’t
Group, 529 U.S. 803; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm., 518 U.S. 727; Sable,
492 U.S. 115.

22.

In re Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975.

23.

In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broad. Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005,
21 F.C.C.R 2664 (2006) (notices of apparent liability and memorandum opinion and order).

24.

In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broad. Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005,
21 F.C.C.R. 13,299 (2006) (order).

25.

See Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Co. at 9, Fox Television
Stations, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (No. 07-582) (bullshit was initially found to be indecent but was later
overturned); Frank Ahrens, FCC Dismisses 36 Indecency Complaints As Not ‘Patently Offensive,’ Wash.
Post, Jan. 25, 2005, at E01; FCC Says Swearing on TV Is OK—Sometimes, Associated Press, Nov. 7,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15607715/.

26. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 463.
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Veteran’s Day because they reasonably feared that the FCC would find it indecent.27
Likewise, a PBS station cancelled a historical documentary about Marie Antoinette
because it contained sexually suggestive drawings.28 Given the government’s zero
tolerance approach toward any use of any of the taboo words, a Vermont public radio
station even barred a state senate candidate from a political debate. The station
manager feared that the candidate might do on air what he had done during a
previous live debate; he had lost his temper and called two audience members
“shits.”29
I will cite just a couple more examples of the rampant self-censorship that is,
sadly, a rational response to the FCC’s arbitrary, subjective rulings. I have chosen
two that should be of special significance to all those with close ties to New York
City. One arose on October 3, 2007, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
landmark court decision that found poet and publisher Lawrence Ferlinghetti not
guilty of obscenity for publishing Alan Ginsberg’s famous poem, “Howl.”30 The
Pacifica Radio station in New York City, WBAI, had been planning to commemorate
the golden anniversary of this historic case—in which the ACLU represented
Ferlinghetti, I am proud to say—by broadcasting a recording of Ginsberg reading the
poem.31 Ironically though, WBAI was forced to cancel these plans. Given the
FCC’s draconian new fines of $325,000 for each taboo word, “Howl” contains more
than enough such words to obliterate WBAI’s $4 million budget.32
The final example I will cite to illustrate the deep chill that the FCC has caused
should especially resonate with those close to Ground Zero. CBS affiliates pulled a
documentary about the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which showed actual footage of shocked
onlookers watching the Twin Towers crash down. Not surprisingly, many of them
were exclaiming in horror, but the documentary was pulled because some of the
horrified exclamations included four-letter words.33
I do not mean to single out the FCC unfairly. To the contrary, my point is that
these kinds of arbitrary rulings will necessarily be issued by any government officials
enforcing any restriction on any sexual expression, given the inevitable vagueness of
any regulations in this inherently subjective area.
27.

Ann Oldenburg, Some Stations Shelved ‘Private Ryan’ Amid FCC Fears, USA Today, Nov. 11, 2004,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2004-11-11-private-ryan_x.htm.

28. Colin Mahan, PBS Beheads Marie Antoinette, TV.com, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.tv.com/story/6484.

html.
29. Philip Baruth, VT Senate Debate Turns, Well, Batshit-Crazy, Vt. Daily Briefing, Oct. 18, 2006, http://

www.vermontdailybriefing.com/?m=200610&paged=2.
30. See Patricia Cohen, Howl in an Era That Fears Indecency, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2007, at E3; see also People

v. Ferlinghetti (1957), as reprinted in Allen Ginsburg, Howl 173–74 (Barry Miles ed., Harper & Row,
Publishers 1986) (1956).
31.

Cohen, supra note 30.

32.

Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU ‘Howls’ Against FCC Destroying the Best Poems of a
Generation (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/censorship/32060prs20071003.html.

33.

See Larry Neumeister, Some CBS Affiliates Worry Over 9/11 Doc, Associated Press, Sept. 3, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/03/ap/entertainment/mainD8JTJSE80.shtml.
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The unguided discretion that is required to enforce such vague concepts as
“offensive” or “indecent” or “obscene” is also likely to be exercised in a discriminatory
fashion, singling out expression that is produced by, or appeals to, individuals or
groups who are relatively unpopular or powerless. Indeed, recent obscenity
prosecutions have targeted expression of lesbian and gay sexuality, as well as rap
music by young African-American men.34 Likewise, the FCC’s crackdowns on
broadcast indecency have disproportionately singled out non-mainstream, countercultural expression. One recent example is the song “Your Revolution” by feminist
rap artist Sarah Jones.35
I would like to conclude on an upbeat note by quoting one of my favorite
philosophers, Woody Allen. He was once coming to the end of a speech, and he told
his audience: “I’d like to end with something positive, but I can’t think of anything
positive to say. Would you settle for two negatives?!” Well, I actually have two
major positives!
First, in a line of recent cases, the Supreme Court consistently has struck down
restrictions on sexual expression in all new media, despite the government’s arguments
that these media should be relegated to the same second-class status as broadcast.36
In these recent cases, the Court has rejected the very same rationale that it had
accepted for broadcast restrictions back in the 1978 Pacifica case, to shield children
from certain sexual expression.37 Rather, in these recent cases, the Court consistently
has held that the goal of shielding children from such expression does not justify
depriving adults of access to it.38 Although the Court has not yet directly reconsidered
or overturned Pacifica itself, in every subsequent case, the Court has read that
precedent very narrowly.39 Accordingly, the Court has rejected restrictions on sexual
expression on telephones (in the context of “Dial-A-Porn”),40 cable television,41 and

34. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stopping the Obscenity Madness 50 Years After Roth v. United

States, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 1, 2–3, 18 (2007).
35.

Dan Odenwald, Commissioners Seek Crackdown on Indecency, Current, July 16, 2001, http://www.
current.org/radio/radio0113indecency.html.

36. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (Internet); Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (virtual child

pornography); Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (cable television); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(Internet).
37.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

38. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 252 (virtual child pornography); Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 819

(cable television); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 846 (internet); Sable, 492 U.S. at 126–27 (dial-a-porn).
39.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870; Sable, 492 U.S. at 127 (representing cases in which Pacifica was
considered an “emphatically narrow” holding).

40. Sable, 492 U.S. 115.
41.

Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803.
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on the Internet.42 These recent decisions have been joined by Justices from across
the ideological spectrum, including even John Paul Stevens, the author of Pacifica.43
The second major positive development is the Supreme Court’s historic 2003
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.44 Not only did the Court strike down the statute at
issue, Texas’s discriminatory ban on same-gender sodomy, but the Court based its
holding on broad-ranging rationales, which should sound the death-knell for all laws
that restrict other personal and private conduct by consenting adults, including their
consumption of sexual expression.45 Most importantly, the Court expressly held that
laws cannot constitutionally be based only on majoritarian views about morality.46
This holding provoked a fierce tirade in Justice Scalia’s strident dissent. He rightly
recognized that this holding should doom a whole host of laws far beyond the
discriminatory anti-sodomy laws that were at issue in Lawrence itself. Justice Scalia’s
list of “endangered laws” expressly includes anti-obscenity laws.47 While this
sweeping potential was the cause of Justice Scalia’s consternation, for civil libertarians
it is cause for celebration. As he wrote:
State laws [that are only based on moral choices include laws] against bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of
Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these
laws is called into question by today’s decision.48

The 1973 decision Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, upholding the obscenity
exception, ruled that this exception was justified to preserve the “moral tone” of the
community.49 Therefore, Justice Scalia was absolutely right in his Lawrence dissent
when he said that the majority’s rationale would warrant overturning the obscenity
exception. In fact, one lower court ruling has held precisely that, Lawrence does spell
the death-knell for anti-obscenity laws.50 In that important ruling, federal judge
Gary Lancaster, in following Lawrence, wrote: “[O]bscenity statutes [unconstitutionally]
burden an individual’s fundamental right to possess, read, observe, and think about
what [they] choose in the privacy of [their] own home.”51 While an appellate court
42.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844.

43.

Justice Stevens joined all the cited opinions. Furthermore, he wrote the majority opinion in Reno v.
ACLU. Id. at 848. In Sable, he joined Justice Brennan’s concurrence to parts I, II, and IV and dissent
to part III of the Court’s opinion. Sable, 492 U.S. at 116.

44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
45.

See id. at 564–606.

46. Id. at 577–78; id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
47.

Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

48. Id.
49. 413 U.S. 49, 68–69 (1973). In holding that “obscene material has no protection under the First

Amendment,” the Court recognized the broad powers of states to protect the public environment. Id.
50. U.S. v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 590–91 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
51.

Id. at 595–96.
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overturned that ruling, it did not do so because it disagreed with Judge Lancaster’s
reading of Lawrence. Rather, the appellate court concluded that only the Supreme
Court itself should directly apply its Lawrence holding to the obscenity context.52 I
am cautiously optimistic that, before long, the Supreme Court will do just that.
I will conclude with a passage from one of the most important First Amendment
opinions ever written, not only on the specific subject I have been addressing, but
also in general. That opinion, written by New York Law School alumnus Justice
John Marshall Harlan, was in the case of Cohen v. California in 1971.53 Since Cohen
upheld free speech specifically for the “f-word,” it should weigh heavily against the
FCC’s new zero tolerance approach toward that very word. We should follow Justice
Harlan’s enlightened approach in Cohen for all expression in all media, including
broadcast. The Cohen case arose during the Vietnam War, and the Court upheld the
right of a young man, Paul Cohen, to wear, inside a courthouse, a jacket on which he
had written a message that was very offensive to many people, not only because it
contained the “f-word,” but also because of its larger point. Specifically, Paul Cohen’s
jacket proclaimed: “Fuck the draft.”54
Notably, Justice Harlan was a conservative Republican who had been appointed
by a Republican president. Many conservatives want to limit government’s power
over our private lives, leaving up to us decisions about what we say, what we see, and
what our own young children see, instead of letting the government dictate these
matters to us. Justice Harlan eloquently explains why denying government such
censorial power is essential not only for individual liberty, but also for our democratic
society. So I will let him have the last word. As he wrote:
[The right of free expression] is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from . . . public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that . . . such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the . . .
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.55

52.

U.S. v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005).

53.

403 U.S. 15 (1971).

54. Id. at 16.
55.

Id. at 24.
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